

CITIZEN'S MOVEMENT AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN JAPAN*

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I. Introduction

Since 1960, Japan has undergone rapid economic growth. The "miracle" of such sustained growth is related to, and not incidentally resulted in, toleration of immense industrial pollution. The problems of a deteriorating natural and social environment neither an unexpected nor unavoidable "by-product" of the high economic growth. Industrial poisoning, for example, has been directly or indirectly responsible for killing large numbers of people. The impact of *kogai*, the general term for environmental pollutants, has pressed far beyond tolerable limits. As government and the business world become more successful in establishing gigantic industrial complexes, the more resultant *kogai* is produced. As a final consequence, the health of the Japanese people and natural beauty of the landscape is in jeopardy.

Although *kogai* is usually translated as "pollution", the concept is unique to Japan and has a much wider meaning. *Kogai* can basically be classified into the two categories: industrial and urban. The first category, primarily focusing on industrial origins includes (1) air pollution and noxious odors caused by soot, smoke and poisonous gases, (2) water (river, sea and lake) and soil pollution caused by liquid waste, (3) noise and vibration, finally, (4) ground subsidence caused by the excessive withdrawal of industrial water and gas. The second category with its urban focus includes (1) air pollution caused by car exhaust and house heating, (2) river pollution caused by the inadequate house drainage and garbage facilities, (3) traffic and other miscellaneous urban noise, (4) such problems as tight housing, inadequate sunshing, traffic congestion, commuting etc. In addition we can raise the third category, i.e. political *kogai*: the infringements on the production basis and the environment caused by the direct exercise of state power. These infringements are manifest in (1) noise and vibration of military bases, (2) water pollution caused by radiation of warships, and (3) air pollution caused by nuclear testing.

As I will mention later, residential or citizen's movements began with protests against such *kogai*. Among the three types, industrial *kogai* represents about 70 percent of the civil outbreaks involving the *kogai* issue. The Japanese refer to protest movements consisting of residents of a particular locality as "resident's movements", but occasionally reserve the term "citizen's movement". Some people use these two concepts differently: resident's movement for the smaller scale movements aimed at specific goals, and citizen's movement for larger scale universally aimed goals. I shall use the concept of citizen's movement to include resident's movements also. Jun Ui (1974:4), one of the most outstanding leaders of citizen's movement in Japan, estimated that there were more than ten thousand organizations of citizen's movements in 1974 focusing their struggle on better living and environmental demands. All of the world's major pollution-caused diseases first appeared in Japan and resulted either from air pollution or from the ingestion of polluted food and water over a long period of time. By January 1979 over 73,000 persons were recognized as *kogai* victims, and hundreds had died directly from these diseases.

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Before I examine the various environmental protest movements, I would like to more concretely delineate the pollution problem by citing the American anthropologist, Robert Smith's (1979:8-10) precise description. Dr. Smith, who first came to Kurusu, Kagawa Prefecture in Shikoku in 1951 and returned in 1975, retrospectively considers the "price of progress" as follows:

In 1951 the only way of reaching Shikoku was by the boat or ferry lines that linked it to the main island of Honshu....the view from the ferry as it swung out into the main channel was of a succession of small islands of greatly varied shapes, some graced with gnarled plum and pine trees, others so dry that they were almost completely barren.... The small fishing boats were always much thicker here, but there were almost no freighters such as could be seen occasionally further out to sea. All along the shoreline up toward the great headland of Yashima were extensive salt fields....

Twenty-five years later, the crossing of the Inland Sea provides a vastly different prospect. Wherever the coastline has proved suitable, land reclamation projects have been carried out. On these great flat extension of the land have been built industrial and marine installations of all kinds – petrochemical plants, oil refineries and storage tanks, deepwater berths for tankers and freighters – all of which discharge their wastes into the air and into the waters of the sea. As a consequence, the Inland Sea has begun to die. On the very hot, humid and windless days of midsummer the view from the ferry is a nightmare. There are few fishing boats left, for most of the marine life that survives is inedible, but through the yellow-brown smog that blankets the entire passage on such a day one can see that there has been an enormous increase in the volume of commercial shipping. On a few islands the vegetation has died off completely, not from lack of water, but from the effects of pollutions discharged by the industrial plants that are everywhere up and down the coasts. Even the island can not be seen clearly any more, unless the ferry passes close by them....the greater evaporation beds of the salt field have long since been converted to landfills for industrial and marine use.... In the perspective of twenty-five years, the crossing is an infuriating reminder of the heedlessness of those who have poisoned the air and the water....

The considerable use of Dr. Smith here is to underscore more vividly one's image of the current state of pollution. Thus the story of citizen's environmental protests begins at the local level. Local governments have encouraged regional industrial development under the control of the national government. In most instances pollution can be attributed not only to industrial activity but also to the encouragement of the government's stimulation of economic growth.

II. Ideology and Reality of High Economic Growth

In 1950 the government established the National Plan for the General Development of Land Act to aid in war damage recovery and to develop the national economy. The basic idea of the Act was taken from the TVA developmental plan model in the U.S.A.. It aimed to establish multi-purpose dams for development of power resources, of agricultural production, and control of river systems. This development plan failed, however, because the large business sector wanted the government to spend public funds on developing industrial areas rather than underdeveloped rural areas.

In 1955, the government established the Five Year Plan for Economic Independence in which the economic growth rate was predicted at 5.0 percent. The actual rate, however, was 9.5 percent in 1955, 8.5 percent in 1956 and eventually 17.3 percent in 1959. From this actual economic growth rate, the planners drew the lessons that high economic growth was not only possible but desirable. In 1960, prime minister Hayato Ikeda announced that the Plan would be pressed to double the national income which aimed in turn to double the real income of the people by 1970. In promising the dissolution of unemployment and poverty and hence, affecting more affluent living, the government proposed a concentration in the following five areas: (1) greater service ability of roads, harbors

industrial lands and waters, railroads, airports, etc., (2) achievement of industrial composition based on heavy chemical industries such as steel, electricity, petro, petrochemical and machine. (3) extension of exports, (4) a greater increase in human capacity and development of scientific technologies, and (5) modernization of agriculture and small enterprise.

In 1962, a Plan for the Pacific Belt Industrialization was established and in 1962 the Comprehensive National Development Plan made public. Since the late 1950's the business world has been concentrating its capital and energy on establishing new plants in cities in the Pacific Belt. This development strategy has been followed by the Strategic Point Development method under the Comprehensive National Development Plan. The basic philosophy of the Strategic Point Development method was to select a limited number of geographically strategic points, develop them as ideal industrial cities, and thereby extending the resultant economic effect to neighboring areas. The government-enacted law also promoting the construction of new industrial cities. According to Hiromi Hata (1976:5-6), the idea of the government initiated method was to set in motion a chain of events which may be summarized as follows:

1. Local government expenditure to improve the industrial environment (land, water, roads and electricity);
2. Encouragement of the establishment of heavy-chemical industry as key enterprises;
3. The development of correlated industry as a result of the introduction of heavy-chemical industry;
4. Development of cities;
5. Change of life style, particularly of food consumption patterns (from a rice-centred pattern);
6. Change in agricultural production in surrounding rural areas (from rice production to multiform production);
7. Raising of individual income in the area (urban and rural);
8. Increase of local government tax revenue;
9. More public investment in the living environment (schools, medical facilities, libraries, parks, etc.);
10. Improvement of social welfare in the area

The reality of the development plan, however, betrayed the planners theoretical intentions. Though local governments competed to attract industry as a revenue-generating device, heavy-chemical industry was not easily induced to move into these areas. Consequently, local governments were faced with serious financial problems. Prior investments for industrial environment improvements suddenly became deficits. Where industries were induced into areas, consequences were increased pollution and industrial disaster rather than increased financial solvency. Because of various tax exemptions given to the invited industries, local government revenues, further, did not increase as expected. Moreover, local industry, particularly fisheries and agriculture, was undermined by land and sea rights sales.

As an example, Kurashiki city, Okayama prefecture, one of fifteen cities designated as a New Industrial City, began its purchasing paddy fields, upland fields and forest for the industrial land in the late 1950's. The municipal government, promoting reclamation to establish Mizushima littoral industrial belt by buying the fisheries rights as of 1960, further transferred industry lands to private enterprises. After that it granted a bounty equivalent to the fixed property tax of the enterprise. Total amounts of the bounty for enterprises by year are as follows:

Table 1/ The bounty for enterprises of Kurashiki City

Year	Amount of grant
1961	10.5 (million yen)*
1962	95.9
1963	123.3
1964	140.7
1965	172.6
1966	236.0
1967	255.0
1968	229.0
1969	208.0
1970	186.0

* note: The average million yen equivalent at this time = \$41,000.00

In launching major enterprises, municipal governments injected 2,790 million yen as preceding investments considered essential for industrial base ground work (such as roads, water, and lands, etc.) in the three years from 1961 to 1964. When one considers the difference in annual municipal revenues between 1965 (1,555 million yen) and 1970 (2,969 million yen), the positive impact of these grants on major enterprises rather than their grantors becomes immediately apparent. For this reason, municipal finance operated at a deficit since 1967, its cumulative deficit reaching 657 million yen from 1967 to 1969. It was therefore an illusion that the New Industrial City designation would make municipal finance profitable and resident welfare beneficial. It became obvious that the launching of big business exploited local residents and made disastrous the communities of which they were a part.

Another result was an increase in pollution. In June of 1965 a discharge of cyanic acid ions into the Mizushima district's Yobimatsu Harbor poisoned large quantities of inland sea fishes. Since 1965 rice plants and other grasses have also withered away and nearly all of the area's agricultural products were damaged by air pollution. In Yobimatsu town, a victim's association of fruit growers has been organized. A member of the association, an old man since retired from rice dealing, said the following in 1974:

This place was once famous for its scenic beauty. Fishermen could make a good living from the ample marine life. But after the beginning of big enterprises, fisheries have suffered serious damage. Though I was a rice dealer, at the same time I cultivated an orchard. But since 1965, fruits did not grow well because of air pollution. Then we formed the victim's association of fruit growers and struggled against the enterprises, prefectural and municipal governments for five years. In the beginning, many peasants gave us the cold shoulder and treated us as madmen. My son succeeded a rice dealer who used to sell his product to the employees of big enterprises. Now however, most enterprises refuse him because of his father's affiliation with the anti-pollution movement. My son complains, saying that he had to take care of his children and not to disturb his business. Employees could better their position in big companies unless they made trouble with the locals. Consequently, they formed a kind of foreign community completely isolated from the local community. Such circumstances and ideas were, I think, the main sources of increase pollution. Though employees also had to be suffering from pollutants they refused to sign their names during any anti-pollution signature-collecting campaign (Saito, 1974: 34-35).

A sociologist who conducted intensive research of Yobimatsu town reported that all fishes taken from the Mizushima inland sea area had been barred from the market as being dangerous to

the health. Thus, fishes from certain areas of Mizushima were bought at a price of seventy percent of the market value. Such a system of compensation began being carried out in 1967 and its revenue sources were covered equally by the prefectural and city governments and related enterprises combined. Thus, the catches that fishermen took from these areas were thrown into the fire. When an old fisherman was asked why he no longer went fishing he answered, "I do not want to take fishes no one needs no matter how much money I can make from them." Compensation aside it was obvious that pollution destroyed one's mental as well as one's material life, a life whose meaning became irreparably altered.

III. The "Corporate State" and the Emergence of Environmental Protest

Dr. Ken'ichi Miyamoto characterized the Japanese government as a kind of "corporate state," in the sense that gigantic corporations subordinate the state to their will running national finance for their own profit. One of the main features of Japanese national finance, first of all and most importantly, centers on the public investment structure. As can be seen in Table 2 (Miyamoto, 1975: 61), the concentration, however, is on the industrial bases with 54.8 percent of the total. In contrast to this, and little more than the "road" expenditure of 20.5 percent, is the 26.1 percent public investment into the living base.

Table 2/ Public investment in the 1960s'

	(billion yen)	(%)
Total	33,726.0	100.0
I. Production base (Social means of production)	18,486.7	54.8
1. Roads	6,915.3	20.5
2. Harbors	748.6	2.2
3. Airports	65.9	0.2
4. Equipage of harbors (including reclamation)	753.7	2.2
5. National railroads	3,809.2	11.3
6. Telegram and telephone	3,453.7	10.2
7. Industrial water	328.6	1.0
8. Agriculture, forestries and fisheries	2,411.7	7.2
II. Living base (Social means of consumption)	8,799.8	26.1
9. Urban planning	583.5	1.7
10. Preparation of housing sites	508.6	1.5
11. Environmental hygiene	360.8	1.1
12. Water supply	1,303.9	3.9
13. Social welfare	691.5	2.1
14. Drainage	764.4	2.3
15. Educational facilities	2,559.1	7.6
III. 16. Conservation of national land	2,114.1	6.3
IV. 17. All others	4,325.4	12.8

In 1973, the national government established the Socio-economic Basic Plan with the infusion of constructing the "welfare society." It planned to raise public investments in the five year period from 1973 to 1977 to 90,000 billion yen. As can be seen in Table 3, however, elements of the production base, like industrial roads etc., remained basically unchanged.

Table 3/ Plans and past records of public investment

	Proposed expenditure 1973-1977		Actual expenditure 1968-1972	
	Amount of money (billion yen)	%	Amount of money (billion yen)	%
Environmental hygiene	7,740	8.6	2,012	5.3
Public rental housing	6,080	6.8	2,388	6.3
Social welfare	1,820	2.0	1,027	2.7
Schools	4,370	4.9	2,535	6.7
Roads	19,000	21.1	8,370	22.1
Railroads	7,850	8.7	3,349	8.8
Airports	770	0.9	270	0.7
Harbors	3,190	3.5	1,101	2.9
Communications	6,510	7.2	3,730	9.8
Conservation of lands	5,830	6.5	2,340	6.2
Agricultures	5,550	6.2	2,263	4.0
All others	18,290	20.3	8,499	22.4
Adjustment	3,000	3.3	-	-
Total	90,000	100.0	37,884	100.0

Professor Miyamoto also points out that the "corporate state" is supported by local governments acting as "agencies" of it and by the "grass-roots conservatism" of local communities. As mentioned previously, the local governments have been accomplices in a crime in their invitations to industry that has been the cause of pollution. Under the "grass-roots conservatism" as well as discontented residents have grown to the suppression of influential political leaders of the local communities. The laboring class, which is expected to change this "conservatism" is controlled by the very enterprises to which laborers belong. Japanese labor unions are generally organized along with their respective enterprises. As a rule, labor unions were reluctant to support the citizen's protest against pollution, insofar as labor unions shared the interests of industrial management in expanding production and improving efficiency. It has been a fact that organized labor as a whole has had a passive and occasionally obstructionist role in the movement to combat pollution.

For example, until 1968, the local labor union of Minamata Chisso Corporation had opposed the Minamata victims, regarding them as "those who would destroy laborer's rice bowls." In another case, Yokkaichi local union of Mitsui Kasei Corporation withdrew from the regional league of labor unions in 1967 when Yokkaichi asthma victims finally filed suit against six of the enterprises including Mitsui. As a final example, a labor union of Kanose factory of Showa Denko supported the company standing against the programs of the Niigata prefectural labor union council which included a policy to support victims of Niigata Minamata disease.

Under such circumstances, only local residents were incured toward membership in citizen's movements against pollution, i.e., only potential victims of local pollution problems had any viable interest in citizen's movements. As has become clear, great discriminatory difficulties arose for local residents was cause to stand up and protest against polluting conditions. Traditionally, people subjected to such personal and environmentally destructive situations simply endured them by "crying themselves to sleep."

Four major exemplary cases will be reviewed. In the case of Minamata disease, which appeared in 1953 in Minamata city, Kumamoto prefecture, it took twenty years for the district court

to order Chisso Corporation to pay compensational monies to all of the victims. Minamata disease originally appeared in cats that ate large amounts of discarded fish taken from Minamata Bay. Shortly afterward, similar difficulties in neurological coordination began to appear in adult humans. In 1956 Dr. Hajime Hosokawa began studying the disease and announced that it was caused by heavy metals ingested via the consumption of contaminated fish. In 1959, a Kumamoto University team singled out methyl mercury as the probable cause of the disease and named Chisso Corporation as the likely source of the mercury. Chisso's management hired their own study team which not surprisingly argued that mercury was not the cause. Thus the real cause remained vague and unidentified, and the numbers both contracted and death victim increased. During the same year, victims and fishermen alike tried to negotiate with the Chisso management for the complete purification of factory polluted water and the compensation of fishing rights. The negotiation failed, however, due to bad faith on the part of Chisso Corporation.

Then in 1965 a Niigata University team found that residents living along the Agano River in Niigata prefecture also had the same neurological symptoms associated with Minamata disease. In March 1966 the Ministry of Health and Welfare concluded that Niigata Minamata disease was caused by methyl mercury originating in wastes from the Kanose plant of Showa Denko (which used the same process as Chisso) on the Agano River. The further conclusion that the Minamata experience had been suppressed, permitting a second outbreak of the disease, caused local residents to rise up in anger. In August, twenty-two separate local organizations including local unions formed the Minamata disease countermeasures council of democratic groups and demanded a solution to the pollution problem. In December the victims themselves formed a group. In June 1967, when victims sued Showa Denko, they filed Japan's first pollution lawsuit and won.

The third among the "Big Four" pollution verdicts was *itai-itai* disease in Toyama prefecture. *Itai-itai* disease, now known to be a result of long-term cadmium poisoning, first appeared among peasants who lived on the Jintsu River in Toyama prefecture. Cadmium poisoning causes brittleness of bone, such that in one case, for examples, a man who received successive pressure fractures of the spine, was shortened in stature by twelve inches. "*Itai*" means "aches and pains", and this disease was so named because patients dies crying "*itai-itai*." The contaminated water of the Jintsu River was used to irrigate rice paddies of local residents. The cause of the disease was unknown prior to Dr. Noboru Hagino's 1957 diagnosis that mineral pollution played leading part. Dr. Hagino, however, was treated as crazed and insensible and his diagnosis therefore was rejected. He had hypothesized that industrial wastes containing cadmium, zinc, and lead, which were released upstream by the Kamioka plant of Mitsui Mining and Smelting in Gifu prefecture was the source of mineral contamination.

Since Dr. Hagino announced that *itai-itai* disease was diagnosed in 1957 as a result of long-term cadmium poisoning, protesters demanded that the compensation must be retroactive to that time. Victims began petitioning the Kamioka smeltery in November 1966, deciding to file suit in January 1968. At the same time that victims began mobilizing and preparing to initiate litigation, the rest of community began to change its view toward *itai-itai* disease. Various groups within Toyama prefecture including labor unions and leftist parties formed the prefectural countermeasures committee to support the victims and to publicise the cadmium pollution situation. In May 1968, shortly after the first group of plaintiffs file suit, the Ministry of Health and Welfare released its conclusions on the origins of the disease, supporting all of the major contentions of Dr. Hagino's cadmium theory and naming Mitsui Mining and Smelting as the most probable source of

contamination. Thus *itai-itai* disease became the first formally recognized pollution disease by the government. The proceeding lawsuit was concluded meanwhile, the verdict was delivered in June 1971. Although the *itai-itai* case was the third pollution suit filed, it was the first to arrive a verdict victorious to the plaintiffs, and thus played a very important part in setting precedents for future pollution litigation.

The fourth case is that of Yokkaichi asthma in Mie prefecture. The Yokkaichi case had been filed prior to the Minamata verdict, but differed from the other three cases. Those other major pollution cases involved water pollution concentrations caused by single sources, whereas the Yokkaichi case involved air pollution resulting from multiple sources. Yokkaichi was the area in which a large group of heavy industries was established for the first time as a *kombinat* type of regional development. *Kombinat* is a Russian word referring to a massive complex of manufacturing firms of related industries, all located within close proximity in order to minimize transportation costs. The concern over pollutants released by these firms was first publicized by fishermen, who demanded compensation for being unable to sell their strange-smelling fish caught nearby since 1958. By 1960 victims of air pollution referred to as Yokkaichi asthma patients were identified. It was already an obvious fact that the widespread asthma was a result of the sulfurous fumes produced by industries in the *kombinat* zone.

In July 1963, the first citizen's assembly was held by the regional labor association in combination with leftist parties etc. This committee seeking countermeasures to pollution generated Yokkaichi city demanded that the city assembly take concrete measures to prevent air pollution and further, to force the polluting firms to install effective prevention equipment. A similar citizen's assembly was held in July 1964, in relation to the death of one victim. In 1965 and 1967, two victims, no longer able to endure their agony, committed suicide. On September 1st, 1967, nine from among the hundreds of certified Yokkaichi victims finally filed suit against six of the *kombinat* enterprises. On July 24th, 1972, after almost five years in court, the plaintiffs won their case.

The major pollution lawsuits cases including "Big Four" mentioned with their damages awarded are listed in Table 4. Table 5 follows, referencing designated pollution diseases and the situational condition of the victims (McKean, 1981: 68 - 72).

Table/4 Damages awarded in pollution diseases litigation

Case	Number of plaintiffs	Total award	Largest award to a single plaintiff	Date suit filed	Date of verdict
Cadmium poisoning Toyama DC	31	57 (million yen)	4 (million yen)	March 1968	June 1971
Mercury poisoning Niigata DC	77	270	10	June 1967	Sept. 1971
Air pollution Yokkaichi DC	12	88	15	Sept. 1967	July 1972
Cadmium poisoning Toyama HC	33	148.2	12	July 1971	August 1972
Mercury poisoning Kumamoto DC	138	930	18	June 1969	March 1973
PCB poisoning Fukuoka DC	46	683	25.7	Feb. 1969	Oct. 1977
SMON disease Tokyo DC-Wakai	35	870	47	May 1971	Oct. 1977
SMON disease Kanazawa DC	16	431*	38.4*	May 1973	March 1978

PCB poisoning Fukuoka DC	729	6,000	17	Nov. 1970	March 1978
SMON disease Tokyo DC	133	3,251	49.7	May 1971	August 1978
SMON disease Hiroshima DC	43	1,070	53.7	April 1973	Feb. 1979

Note: DC = District Court; HC = High Court; Wakai = Court-mediate settlement.

"Number of plaintiffs" refers only to the number of plaintiffs in the single civil suit in which the verdict was pronounced. These are additional PCB suits involving at least 331 plaintiffs, and in the case of SMON there are over 28 additional suits.

* Includes interest (250 and 28 million yen, respectively without interest).

Table 5/ Pollution disease victims

Designated pollution diseases	Alive	Dead	Total	Applications pending
Organic mercury poisoning Kumamoto and Kagoshima Niigata	1,478 676	287 66	1,765 742	5,982 230
Cadmium poisoning Toyama (<i>itai-itai</i> disease) Tsushima	230 22	120	350 22	
Chronic arsenic trioxide poisoning Miyazaki Shimane	99 17	10 3	109 20	
Air pollution disease 41 designated zones (January 1979)	71,190	625	71,815	
Total victims shown above	73,712			
Other Environmentally related disease PCB (Kanemi cooking oil)*	1,578	51	1,629	
Morinaga arsenic powdered milk**	11,839	505	12,344	
Thalidomide***	253	?	?	
Hexavalent chromium****	191	41	232	
SMON*****				approximately 11,000

* PCB or polychlorinated biphenyl, contaminated a large batch of rice bran cooking oil produced by the Kanemi Company in North Kyushu. The contaminated oil was sold throughout western Japan in 1968.

** The Morinaga Dairy Corporation accidentally allowed powdered arsenic to enter a large batch of powdered formula for babies in 1955, and babies all over Japan were affected.

*** The Japanese thalidomide disaster was settled out of court in December 1974, with awards to individual survivors ranging from 3 million yen to 40 million yen.

**** Hexavalent chromium poisoning victims are confirmed only among those who have handled the toxin during the course of their work.

***** SMON or subacute-myelo-optico-neuropathy, is a disease resulting at least in part from the ingestion of large quantities of quiniform (or chionoform), a drug prescribed for stomach ailments. It produces a variety of chronic central nervous system disabilities up to and including paralysis and blindness.

IV. Development of Citizen's Movements and the Community in Transition

On the day the Yokkaichi district court verdict was brought in, residents noted critically that "even though victims have been awarded their damages, we can never again restore cleanliness to the blue sky." It must be remembered that the lawsuit is the chief, but only one, of the means toward compensation employed by citizen's movements, and that such verdicts signal nothing more than the approval of public opinion. Lesser effective, more typically passive anti-pollution movements exist as

well. Though people organize to rectify problems, a complete stabilization of the situation is difficult regardless of verdict and compensation. Ironically, and unfortunately as well, if the goal of the movement is the recovery of the original environmental situation, its achievements in reality never come close even if ideally successful.

The citizen's movement of Mishima and Numazu cities and Shimizu town in Shizuoka prefecture in 1964, where the residents prevented the introduction of a new petrochemical *kombinat*, may be regarded as the first successful anti-pollution movements in this sense. In contrast to other cases like Minamata where the movement took place after the water pollution had damaged individuals severely, the citizen's movement of Mishima-Numazu succeeded in preventing establishment of the pollution industries.

The governor of Shizuoka prefecture, Toshio Saito, proposed the amalgamation of Mishima, Numazu and Shimizu in May 1963. According to his initial prefectural plan, post-amalgamation success of the new city would further consolidate itself by the absorption of outlying towns and villages, to be finally realized as a million population industrial city. At such time, the comprehensive development plan called for the designation of an industrial zone to which petro-chemical industries could be invited. This plan was announced in December 1963. However, in 1964 a movement began in all two cities and a town to oppose both the amalgamation plan and its associated proposal to attract petro-chemical industries. The movement succeeded within the following year to persuade pro-development local officials to cancel their plan.

Professor Miyamoto pointed out three important lessons which can be drawn from the above movement (1975: 220 – 221). First, the success of the movement was due to the united social power of the residents. It was estimated that almost 80 – 90 percent of the voting population supported the movement. The citizen's meeting in Numazu in September 1964, as an example, mobilized 25,000 people, one third of total voting population of the city. In all two cities and a town, neighborhood association adopted anti-development resolutions and the municipal assemblies then, in turn, voted their opposition in total.

Secondly, the movement sought to encourage small group meetings to procure more exact information regarding pollution. High school teachers prepared slide and film presentations, going every night to various neighborhood associations to explain the terrible details encountered in other industrial cities. Many groups also went to other industrial complexes like Yokkaichi to see firsthand pollution effects, and brought into stark reality what the future of their own industrial development would look like.

The third lesson involves both the integration as well as diversity the movement achieved. Many associations suddenly became united toward anti-development while still able to maintain their own doctrines. Labor unions such as national railroad workers, school teachers, and local government workers, cooperative associations such as farmers, fishermen, medical practitioners, and pharmacists; traditional regional associations such as neighbors, housewives, young men and women, as well as various voluntary citizen's associations became intrinsically involved. The success of the movement particularly rested on cooperation between the more radical activists of younger voluntary associations and the elder, more traditional leaders of neighborhood associations.

In contrast to the Mishima-Numazu-Shimizu movement, the movement in Fuji city began only after industrial attraction and the amalgamation of cities had been fully realized. However, it may also be regarded as the successful case. Fuji city is a highly industrial complex, where paper-pulp products account for 40 percent of national product. It is noteworthy for the *hedoro* problem

(waste from paper-pulp processing) that has caused the decimation the once beautiful Tagonoura Port on Suruga Bay. *Hedoro* (slime) is a mass of fine particles and other organic substances, including poisonous gases, that accumulate and solidify in shallow bodies of water.

Fishermen first began petitioning the local authorities for compensation at the close of the 1950's. At that time, however, no adequate results were obtained. In the meantime, Fuji City, Yoshiwara City and Takaoka town were amalgamated into the new "Fuji City" in November 1966. The new mayor was the younger brother of the president of Daishowa Paper-Pulp Company, one of major companies in the area. In March 1968, the Tokyo Electric Company announced plans to construct a thermal power plant on the Fuji River. Anti-pollution movements existing at that time sided in the organization of regional groups. These groups wanted the complete elimination of *hedoro* wastes and a dredging of the bay. In the following April 1968, one month after the construction announcement a citizen's committee of countermeasures on pollution was formed by a combination of regional labor associations and the leftist parties in addition to the existing anti-pollution activist groups.

Originally, Tokyo Electric Company planned to construct a thermal plant in Numazu city in 1964. The plan was canceled because of Numazu citizen's movement opposition in 1964. This afforded the people of Fuji to learn of Mishima-Numazu experiences which enhanced the wide mobilization of residents. The movements demanding to stop the disposal of *hedoro* into the sea and further construction of industries was now combined and spearheaded toward a total halt of thermal power plant construction. Finally, in January 1970, the reformist candidate for mayor defeated the paper-pulp sponsored candidate, sealing construction blockage in Fuji.

In November 1970, the movement filed a civil suit against the prefectural governor and the four major pulp companies. An out-of-court settlement in December 1976 awarded 1.1 billion yen to the fisherman's cooperative association. And in september 1977, a Tokyo high court, ruling that the dumping of *hedoro* was illegal, ordered the pulp companies to find other means of waste disposal, and further, to reimburse the prefecture for expense incurred in dredging Tagonoura Bay (Mckean, 1981: 32).

The success of the movement noted here, however, as opposed to the Mishima-Numazu case is rather exceptional. In general, the current of the difficulties faced by citizen's movements since the mid-1970's has been altered. Firstly, to demand a simple withdrawal can be no longer supported by the residents who live in so called "underdeveloped" areas. The residents of Tomakomai in Hokkaido, for example, have expressed their attitude toward the city development plans statistically summarized as follows:

Table 6/ Results of development plan questionnaires

	Supporters				Initially opposed	Opponents		D.K.		Total	
	Uncon- ditioned		Condi- tioned								
Dec. 1973		(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
Municipal workers	10	5.0	136	67.3		50	24.8	6	3.0	202	
Employees of companies	22	6.8	233	72.4		46	14.3	21	6.5	322	
Entrepreneurs	14	10.3	101	74.3		14	10.3	7	5.1	136	
Others	10	7.1	89	63.6		24	17.1	17	12.1	140	
Total	56	7.0	559	69.9		134	16.7	51	6.4	800	
Dec. 1974											
Municipal workers	5	7.6	40	60.6		19	28.8	2	3.0	66	
Employees of companies	18	8.1	159	71.3		25	11.2	21	9.4	223	
Entrepreneurs	15	21.7	51	73.9		1	1.4	2	2.9	69	
Others	22	7.4	186	62.6		45	15.2	44	14.8	297	
Total	60	9.4	436	66.6		90	13.7	69	10.5	655	
Dec. 1975											
Municipal workers	2	2.8	47	66.2		14	19.7	8	11.3	71	
Employees of companies	24	9.9	195	80.6		10	4.1	13	5.4	242	
Entrepreneurs	15	16.0	71	75.5		5	5.3	3	3.2	94	
Others	18	7.0	186	72.4		22	8.6	31	12.1	257	
Total	59	8.9	499	75.1		51	7.7	55	8.3	664	
Dec. 1976											
Municipal workers	2	2.7	39	53.4	17	23.3	11	15.1	4	5.5	73
Employees of companies	25	9.7	164	63.8	50	19.5	10	3.9	8	3.1	257
Entrepreneurs	15	15.0	69	69.0	9	9.0	3	3.0	4	4.0	100
Others	17	6.8	153	60.9	50	19.9	14	5.6	17	6.8	251
Total	59	8.7	425	62.4	126	18.5	38	5.6	33	4.8	681
Dec. 1977											
Municipal workers	6	6.5	47	50.5	18	19.3	16	17.2	6	6.5	93
Employees of companies	46	14.0	174	52.9	46	14.0	26	7.9	37	11.2	329
Entrepreneurs	32	21.8	68	46.2	26	17.7	14	9.5	7	4.8	147
Others	41	9.8	178	42.5	73	17.4	44	10.5	83	19.8	419
Total	125	12.6	468	47.3	163	16.5	100	10.1	133	13.5	988
Nov. 1978											
Municipal workers	10	13.1	38	50.0	17	22.4	7	9.2	4	5.3	76
Employees of companies	49	14.0	170	48.7	71	20.3	21	6.0	38	10.9	349
Entrepreneurs	15	13.1	53	46.5	22	19.3	6	5.3	18	15.8	114
Others	28	6.5	197	45.4	102	23.5	27	6.2	80	18.4	434
Total	102	10.5	458	47.0	212	21.8	61	6.3	140	14.4	973

Motojima and Shoji, eds., 1980: 21, initially from the Tomakomai Minposha.

Tomakomai is one of five focal areas the government selected according to its New Comprehensive National Development Plan in 1969. The basic strategy of the development plan was the establishment of gigantic industrial bases in remote areas. According to the plan, for example, the gigantic Mutsu-Ogawara industrial base in Aomori prefecture would refine two million barrels of crude oil per day. In the case of Tomakomai, one million barrels will be processed per day. No one knows what effect these huge petro-chemical industries will have on the natural and social environment of the area. Central and local governments are using all the devices available to them to persuade the local people of the advantages of industrial complex development. If the government and the business world are successful in their drive to establish these gigantic complexes, the pollution produced cannot help but add to the detriment of the health and nature of the Japanese land and people.

As Table 6 indicates, however, the people of Tomakomai are mostly conditioned supporters. Opposition was 16.7 percent in 1973 and declined in 1978 to 6.3 percent. After construction was begun 1976, the statistical column "initially opposed" was added. From the questionnaire results, one may speculate that from among those who once opposed the plan, conditional support arose. Although it is rather difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between anti-development and conditioned pro-development, statistics, the unconditional supporters of the plan on the other hands, encompass only a small portion of total population: 7.0 percent in 1973 to 10.5 percent in 1978.

In Tomakomai, the city authorities attempted first to promote the national development plan through the construction of an industrial harbor to the east of the city in 1968. But when the master plan was announced by the national government in 1970, they were sorely embarrassed by its extraordinarily large scale and suddenly reluctant to lend it support. Thus in November 1973, the city basic plan for the development of the eastern part of Tomakomai was announced as an independent action. Although referred to as "the city plan" it essentially represented the "first stage" of the national project. In 1973, an association to oppose the development was formed by labor unions and the leftist parties. The strategy of the association was to demand the complete withdrawal of the plan. Reformists, campaigning for this strategic goal, focused their fight in the mayor's election of April 1975. The former mayor, however, appealing in his election campaign that he would promote the development plan event at the risk of his political career, defeated the reformist candidate. At this point, the movement, headed by the association of regional labor, socialist, and communist parties, had no alternatives against the regional development. Although the movement had always presupposed the existence of a national plan and stood ready to oppose it, few other efforts were made to single out the actual needs of local residents. Except for the few people who did not want further "development" of the city, most citizens fundamentally agreed with the indigenous regional development plan, if it were to be at all possible, even in the face of anxiety regarding developmental exploitation and subsequent pollution by the national government.

The second difficulty of citizen's movements concerns solidarity among residents. Issues of citizen's movements usually split the residential sector sharply due to their differences in interests and values. For example, the attraction of new industries into a rural area may bring economic benefits to the local government, to shops who can expect new customers, to peasants who can sell their land and thus escape their agricultural fetters, to people who can expect new job opportunities, etc. On the other hand, industrial attraction may bring economic disadvantage to local factories afraid of losing their own economic prowess, to peasants who do not wish to sell their land, and to people who are simply fearful of pollution results.

Another difficulty may be seen in relation to city-type pollutants where the relationship between causes of pollution and sufferers of it is not so clearly defined as in the case of industrial pollution. The residents at busy intersections of main roads, for example, may organize an anti-car-pollution movement, though at the same time they may also be users of cars. The "enemy" of the anti-pollution movement continually lives "next door", or put another way, each citizen is his own worst enemy. Thus anti-pollution movements have necessarily tended to be developed into movement advocating the involvement of residents in regional planning. Anti-pollution or anti-development movements are to be tied up with community formation movements attaining a consensus of opinion among the residents.

Community formation is one of the important goals of the citizen's movement, in the sense that the citizen's movement is in itself a community formation; the community being based on

democratic self-government. To this regard in her excellent study, Dr. McKean has argued that the characteristics of Japanese citizen's movements are as follows:

Their message is home-grown, not imported, indicating that Japanese political culture had an indigenous potential for democratic "evolution". To the Japanese who have become active in citizen's movements, the idea they have something called "rights" which have been "unjustly" trampled upon, that the system itself owes them some recourse, that democratic procedures are actually devices that exist precisely for the situation in which they find themselves, is attractive and satisfying. It helps them to interpret situation and it gives them guidance in responding to it (McKean, 1981: 268).

She then concludes her argument by citing an elderly fisherman:

In this kind of situation, we used to just put up with it and cry ourselves to sleep. But this time it affected our economic circumstances and our health. So we just had to rise up and protest against it. Why it went against the ideas of democratic politics!... The way things are now, the government tells the people what to do, but it's supposed to be the other way around, you know (*ibid.*).

Almost thirty five years ago in 1948, E. Herbert Norman was invited to address an anniversary celebration at Keio University in Tokyo, titling his lecture "Persuasion or Force". In this lecture he explained, self-government "means that the people look upon government officials as their servants or as their deputies and not as their masters. It is the very opposite of that old concept, *kanson minpi*". *Kanson minpi* means literally, "official-revering, people-despising"; or more properly, putting government above people, overestimating government at the expense of people. Norman's argument is, I believe, still important to the present situation of Japan. He concluded his speech at Keio with this remarks:

Once liberty is dead, people must lose their self-respect; despair, envy, deceit and malice will grow apace like weeds in a deserted garden but no people who have lost their freedom can bequeath any lasting benefit to succeeding ages. They will leave behind no inspiration or generous work to which their descendants can look with pride and gratitude.

... Persuasion is not only the way of reason and humanity, it is now the sole path of self-preservation. Thus we are, all of us, whatever our nation or status, faced with the stern alternative: **PERSUADE OR PERISH.**

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